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COMPENSATING FACT WITNESSES:
THE PRICE IS SOMETIMES RIGHT
DouglasR. Richmond*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, Feld Entertainment, Inc. ("Feld"), which produces circus
shows under the trade name Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus,
sued the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
("ASPCA") and other animal welfare and wildlife organizations and
individuals for alleged offenses related to a lawsuit wherein the
defendants-then plaintiffs-had unsuccessfully sued Feld for allegedly
mistreating its circus elephants.1 A former Feld employee, Tom Rider,
was the star witness for the then-plaintiffs in what we will call the
"elephant case."2 Rider purportedly quit his job as an elephant attendant
because of the mistreatment of an elephant he worked with, and he
testified about the alleged abuse of the animals, which was central to the
elephant case.3 His testimony in the elephant case lacked credibility and
was unpersuasive, 4 but remunerative.5 Indeed, Rider was paid
handsomely for his service in the losing cause, having received cash
payments exceeding $190,000, plus "non-cash compensation, such
as a van, hotel rooms, cell phone use, a video camera, zoom

* Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Chicago, Illinois. J.D., University of
Kansas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska; B.S., Fort Hays State University. Opinions expressed here
are the author's alone.
1. First Amended Complaint at 1, Feld Entm't, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, Civ. Action No. 1:07-01532 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2010) [hereinafter FEI
Complaint]; Jessica Gresko, Animal Rights Group Settles Lawsuit with Ringling, DENVER POST
(Dec. 28, 2012, 9:03 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_22273969/animal-rightsgroup-settles-lawsuit-with-ringling.
2. See Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp.
2d 55, 57-58, 66-73 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining Rider's factual role in the elephant case).
3. Id. at 67-72.
4. ld.at67&n.12.
5. See id. at 73-83 (describing Rider's compensation as a witness).
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camera equipment and a lap top computer" from the nowdefendant organizations.
In holding for Feld in the elephant case, the district court
determined that Rider's compensation, which the organizations allegedly
tried to disguise as grants and expense reimbursements, and which they
later attempted to conceal from Feld in discovery, was principally
intended to motivate Rider to advance their purposes in the litigation.7 In
its lawsuit, Feld bluntly characterized the organizations' payments to
Rider as "bribery of a witness."8 Regardless of the label affixed to
Rider's compensation by the organizations, the eventual cost to the
ASPCA was substantial. 9 In December 2012, the ASPCA settled Feld's
claims against it for $9.3 million.'0
Rider's compensation as a fact witness in the elephant case was
extraordinary in its amount, structure, and purpose. The litigation is also
remarkable because the payments to Rider-at least as reported in the
district court opinion in the elephant case and as described in Feld's
pleadings-were so glaringly improper and prejudicial." At the same2
time, former employees of parties are frequently vital fact witnesses.'
They often have unique factual knowledge. From former employees'
perspectives, however, participating in litigation may take them away
from their current jobs, thereby costing them income or vacation time, it
may impede their self-employment or it may interrupt their retirements.
It is therefore understandable that former employees may want to be
paid for devoting time to litigation in which they have no stakes. They
may well seek compensation for time spent testifying, meeting with
lawyers, or otherwise assisting with case preparation.' 3 Other fact
witnesses likewise may be interested in compensation for their time
connected to litigation."4 In patent litigation, for example, an inventor
who is a fact witness also may be an essential consultant who deserves
compensation for time spent in the latter role. 5 Passersby who witness
6.

FEI Complaint, supra note 1, at 9; see also Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to

Animals, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 73-83 (detailing the organizational defendants' payments to Rider in the
underlying case and their alleged efforts to conceal and disguise them).
7.
8.
9.

Am. Soc 'yfor the Preventionof Cruelty to Animals, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 79-83.
FEI Complaint, supra note 1, at 10.
Gresko, supra note 1.

10. Id,
11. Am. Soc "yforthe Preventionof Cruelty to Animals, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 67, 73-83.
12. See John K. Villa, Paying Fact Witnesses, ACCA DOCKET, Oct. 2001, at 112, 11214, available at http://www.wc.com/assets/attachments/ACCDocketPayingFactWitnesses_
Oct_2001 .pdf.
13. Id. at 112.
14. Id. at 112-13.
15. See, e.g., Aristocrat Techs. v. Int'l Game Tech., No. C-06-03717, 2010 WL 2595151, at
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accidents may be critical to the outcome in resulting litigation and
parties may want to compensate them for taking time off from their jobs
to testify. The list goes on.
It was once the rule that fact witness compensation was limited to
statutory witness fees or subpoena rates.1 6 The prohibition on greater
compensation rested on several factors, including the concern that such
payments could entice fact witnesses to perjure themselves, the concern
that greater compensation might simply influence witnesses to shade or
shape their testimony in ways favorable to the parties paying them, the
worry that greater compensation could price justice out of the reach of
some parties, and the concern that extra compensation would create an
appearance of impropriety.' 7 Courts further considered fact witnesses'
testimony to be their civic duty.' 8 On the other hand, conscientious fact
witnesses may be required to devote considerable time to preparing their
testimony and actually testifying in cases in which they are called. The
overwhelming majority of witnesses faithfully honor their oaths to
testify truthfully; 9 assuming that their compensation is timely disclosed,
witnesses' alleged biases attributable to such payments can be exposed
on cross examination. 20 Not all witnesses believe that losing income or
incurring unreimbursed expense in connection with litigation qualifies as
civic duty.21 In any event, over time, restrictions on fact witness
compensation have loosened. 2 Compensating fact witnesses beyond

*2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2010) (concluding that a party's $100,000 lump sum payment to an the
inventor of the patents-in-suit to consult in litigation would not support a claim that the party had
unclean hands; although the inventor was already contractually required to cooperate with the party
in litigation and to testify as needed, the contracts did not obligate the inventor to consult in
litigation).
16. See, e.g., Wright v. Somers, 125 111.App. 256, 257 (1906). The court noted that:
The legislative department of our State has declared that every witness attending in
his own county upon trials in the courts of record shall be entitled to receive the sum of
one dollar for each day's attendance and five cents per mile each way for necessary
travel .... This is all the witness is entitled to receive. To demand more is forbidden by
the policy and spirit of this statute.
Id. (citation omitted).
17. Ayesha B. Hardaway, Unpatriotic or Commonplace Practice? Compensating
Fact Witnesses, FOR THE DEF., Apr. 2010, at 50, 51, availableat http://www.dritoday.org/ftd/201004F.pdf; Villa, supranote 12, at 112.
18. Hardaway, supra note 17, at 50.
19. Witnesses under oath are presumed to testify truthfully until it is shown otherwise. State
v. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d 603, 626 (La. 2011) (quoting Fridge v. Talbert, 158 So. 209, 212 (La. 1934));
Fletcher v. Bolz, 520 N.E.2d 22, 25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
20. State v. Kelly, 770 A.2d 908, 930 (Conn. 2001).
21. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof IEthics, Op. 668 (1994) [hereinafter N.Y. Op. 668].
22. Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Gary S. Colton, Jr., Compensating Fact Witnesses, 184 F.R.D. 425,
427 (1999).
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statutory witness fees and expenses to which they are entitled is now a
common practice, and has been for some time. 23
But while restrictions on fact witness compensation are looser than
they once were, they are not lax.24 Lawyers and parties may not pay fact
witnesses for their testimony, even if the testimony is truthful. 25 The
general rule, in condensed form, is that lawyers and litigants may
compensate fact witnesses for time spent testifying, preparing to testify,
or assisting in the litigation, and may reimburse witnesses' associated
expenses, provided that the amounts paid or reimbursed are reasonable,
are not conditioned on the act of testifying or the content or substance of
the witnesses' testimony, and are not contingent upon the outcome of the
litigation.2 6 Lawyers cannot condition fact witnesses' compensation on
their agreements not to voluntarily speak with other parties or their
counsel.2 7 If a fact witness asks that her lawyer attend an interview,
meeting, or deposition, it is generally permissible to pay that lawyer's
reasonable fees and expenses for attending, again provided that any
payment is not tied to the outcome of the case or conditioned on the
content or substance of the witness's testimony.28
Of course, general rules are subject to exceptions, as where the law
of a jurisdiction compels a different result, and the reasonableness of
payments to fact witnesses frequently is in the eye of the beholder. No
two courts are guaranteed to evaluate reasonableness the same way.29
Even if payments to a fact witness are reasonable, additional
inducements, such as a party's promise to indemnify the witness in

23. See, e.g., Slayton v. Weinberger, 194 S.E.2d 703, 706 (Va. 1973) (calling it a "well
known fact that agreements to pay witnesses for lost time and expenses incurred, in excess of the
statutory fees, are not unusual, extraordinary or improper").
24. See Kinsler & Colton, supra note 22, at 427-28.
25. Rocheux Int'l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merch. Fin. Grp., Inc., Civ. No. 06-6147, 2009 WL
3246837, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009); Ward v. Nierlich, No. 99-14227-CIV, 2006 WL 5412626, at
*4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2006); In re Telcar Grp., Inc., 363 B.R. 345, 353-54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007);
In re Kien, 372 N.E.2d 376, 379 (I11.1977).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117 cmt. b (2000).
27. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2013) (prohibiting lawyers from

unlawfully obstructing parties' access to evidence); id R. 3.4(f) (providing that lawyers generally
cannot "request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information
to another party").
28. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 962 (2013); N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers'
Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op., 729 (2000); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 0805 (2008).
29. Villa, supra note 12, at 114 (stating that calculating reasonable payments is "necessarily a
case-by-case determination, based on the witness's direct loss of income. In the absence of a direct
loss, counsel must determine reasonable value based on all of the relevant circumstances").
Compare Rocheux Int' of N.J, Inc., 2009 WL 3246837, at *2-5, with Slayton v. Weinberger, 194
S.E.2d 703, 706 (Va. 1973).
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connection with the litigation, may prove to be too much. 30 Lawyers'
and litigants' failures to disclose fact witnesses' compensation, or their
failure to do so timely, as well as fact witnesses' failure to reveal their
31
compensation when called upon to do so, can also affect the calculus.
If a lawyer's or a litigant's compensation of a fact witness is held to
be improper, there are a number of possible consequences. For example,
the court may order a new trial; 32 the lawyer or litigant or both may be
sanctioned; 33 the lawyer may be disqualified from further participation in
the litigation; 34 the lawyer may face professional discipline; 35 and the
lawyer, party, and witness all may tempt criminal prosecution.3 6 Courts
generally are reluctant to exclude a witness's testimony on the sole basis
that the witness has been paid, preferring to leave it to the jury to weigh
the witness's credibility or, in court-tried cases, to weigh the testimony
themselves. 37 Nonetheless, courts have discretion to exclude or strike
improperly or unreasonably compensated fact witnesses' testimony as
a sanction.38
30. See, e.g., New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 166 F.R.D. 284, 289-90 & n.4 (W.D.N.Y.
1996) (finding nothing improper in parties paying a fact witness a reasonable hourly fee for his time
and in reimbursing his expenses, but concluding that the parties "went too far" in promising to
indemnify the witness in two cases, including the pending case).
31. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of N.Y., 293 F.R.D. 498, 504-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (granting a
new trial where the plaintiff did not timely reveal a compensation arrangement with a key fact
witness); ESN, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 631, 651 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (sanctioning the
defendants for their "deliberate, willful failure" to disclose an employment agreement with a
witness), aff'd, 397 F. App'x 630 (Fed. Cir. 2010); United States v. Cinergy Corp., No. 1:99-cv1693, 2008 WL 7679914, at *10-15 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2008) (ordering a new trial where defense
counsel did not reveal fact witness's compensation and allegedly misled jury about witness's
compensation, and witness did not reveal employment or compensation when testifying).
32. See, e.g., Solvent Chem. Co., 166 F.R.D at 289-90.
33. See, e.g.,ESN, LLC, 685F. Supp. 2dat651.
34. See, e.g., McIntosh v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Civ. Action No. 1:06CV1080, 2008
WL 941640, at *1-2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 4, 2008) (disqualifying affiliated law firms for lead law firm's
improper witness payments and other improprieties). But see Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Johnson Elec.
N. Am., Inc., No. 09-11783, 2011 WL 1812505, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2011) (declining to
disqualify a law firm that compensated a fact witness in alleged violation of Model Rule 3.4(b));
Dyll v. Adams, No. CIV.A. 3:94-CV-2734-D, 1997 WL 222918, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 1997)
(explaining that disqualification is not an appropriate remedy for a Model Rule 3.4(b) violation
because "[t]he ethical breach is discrete and can be cured, if necessary, by less drastic means").
35. See, e.g., Rocheux Int'l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merch. Fin. Grp., Inc., Civ. No. 06-6147,
2009 WL 3246837, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009) (reserving judgment on the need for disciplinary
action for plaintiff's counsel pending further application).
36. See, e.g., In re Kien, 372 N.E.2d 376, 379 (111.1977) (suspending an attorney from the
practice of law for eighteen months for paying a fact witness).
37. United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 37-38 & n.31, 39 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting United
States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 547 (1st Cir. 1987)); see, e.g., Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Horizonte
Fabricacao Distribuicao Importacao Exportacao Ltda, No. 08-20738-CV, 2010 WL 625356, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2010); TBC Corp. v. Wall, 955 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
38. See Just in Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC v. Murray, No. 12CA1261, 2013 WL 3778184, at
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This Article examines lawyers' and litigants' compensation of fact
witnesses, with a primary focus on lawyers' conduct. Although this
Article refers to fact witnesses, it should be understood that these are
third-party fact witnesses-fact witnesses who are not employed by a
party to the litigation in which they are expected to testify. Most fact
witness compensation controversies involve third-party fact witnesses;
parties' ordinary compensation of current employees for time spent
testifying or preparing to testify is not controversial. 39 Courts and jurors
well understand that fact witnesses who are currently employed by
parties are being paid for their time devoted to a case and any potential
bias on the part of such witnesses attributable to their employment is
open for evaluation by the fact finder.4 ° Part II analyzes applicable rules
of professional conduct and the operation of the federal anti-bribery or
anti-gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. 4 ' States may have bribery or
witness tampering statutes similar to the federal anti-gratuity statute and
lawyers must be sensitive to those,4 2 but the case law on fact witness
payments has mostly developed around the federal statute, making it the
logical subject of discussion here.43 Part III discusses illustrative cases,
some in which the courts held that payments to fact witnesses were
proper and others in which the courts rejected the compensation
arrangements. 44 Finally, Part IV offers practical guidance to lawyers
weighing whether and how to compensate fact witnesses.45
II.

GOVERNING RULES AND STATUTES

Lawyers who are considering compensating third-party fact
witnesses for their time spent testifying or preparing to testify must
comply with rules of professional conduct in the process. 46 In addition,
both lawyers and litigants who compensate fact witnesses must ensure
that their conduct is permissible under the federal anti-bribery or antigratuity statute.47
*15 (Colo. Ct. App. July 18, 2013) (outlining trial court's options on remand).
39. See infra Part U.
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); see infra Part H.
42. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.02(C)-(D) (West 2006) (criminalizing the
bribery of witnesses).

43. See infra Parts I.C, HI.
44. See infra Part HI.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2013).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2006). Again, lawyers must also be sensitive to particular state
statutes criminalizing the bribery of witnesses and witness tampering. See, e.g., OHIO § 2921.02(C)(D) (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.72.090 (West 2009).
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A.

Model Rule of ProfessionalConduct 3.4(b)

The most widely applicable ethics rule is Model Rule of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rule") 3.4(b), which provides that a
lawyer shall not "falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibitedby law. 48
Although "inducements" to witnesses commonly take the form of
monetary payments, the term is not so limited. a9 Various other benefits
promised to witnesses or advantages conferred on them may qualify as
inducements for Model Rule 3.4(b) purposes.5 °
Model Rule 3.4(b) reflects the concern that some financial
arrangements with witnesses may encourage witnesses to exaggerate,
shade, or even falsify their testimony, thereby undermining the integrity
of the judicial process, which depends on truthful testimony by
witnesses. 5 Recognizing that fact witnesses should not have to go outof-pocket to fulfill their civic responsibilities, however, Comment 3 to
Model Rule 3.4 notes that "it is not improper to pay a witness's
expenses," while cautioning lawyers that "[t]he common law rule in
most jurisdictions'5is2 that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any
fee for testifying."
The Model Rule 3.4(b) prohibition on offers of unlawful
inducements to witnesses extends beyond bribery. 53 Consistent with the
language of the Comment to the Rule, lawyers cannot compensate fact
witnesses for testifying.54 Lawyers may not pay fact witnesses for their
testimony even if the testimony is truthful.55 Perhaps more obviously,
lawyers cannot condition fact witnesses' compensation on the content,
substance, or perceived usefulness of their testimony,5 6 nor may lawyers
offer to pay fact witnesses fees that are contingent upon the outcome of
the matter.57
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2013) (emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660, 670 (D. Kan.
1998) (discussing the employment of witnesses as a pretext for paying for their testimony and
offering free legal services as an inducement to testify).
50. See id. ("Counsel can provide an inducement by providing free legal service.").
51. Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., No. CIV-99-2573, 2000 WL 976800, at *23 (D. Md. June 19, 2000).
52.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 3 (2013).

53. Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass'n, 865 F.
Supp. 1516, 1524-26 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
54. Id. at 1526.
55. Id.; see also, e.g., Ward v. Nierlich, No. 99-14227-CIV, 2006 WL 5412626, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 20, 2006); In re Telcar Grp., Inc., 363 B.R. 345, 354 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Kien,
372 N.E.2d 376, 379 (111.1977).
56. Fla. Barv. Wohl, 842 So. 2d 811, 814-16 (Fla. 2003).
57.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117(2) (2000); see, e.g.,
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The practical problem when looking at the plain language of Model
Rule 3.4(b) and Comment 3 is that neither appears to permit lawyers to
pay fact witnesses for time spent testifying at a deposition, hearing, trial,
or other proceeding, or preparing to testify. 58 The Rule and Comment by

their terms leave a substantial gap: compensating fact witnesses for their
time spent testifying or preparing to testify is not the same as paying
them for their testimony, which the common law prohibits, nor is it the
same as paying their expenses, which is permissible. 59 At the same time,
solid practical and policy reasons support compensating fact witnesses
for their time and effort:
Some witnesses need to reacquaint themselves with voluminous
paperwork. Matters that need revisiting may be both complex and far
removed in time. Effective, organized testimony (the type useful to the
parties and the court) often requires extensive and time-consuming
preparation. There is no statutory or ethical requirement that a lawyer
must be content with only a cursory, surface investigation of the facts.
Nor must a lawyer limit him or herself to finding witnesses who have
an abundance of time and money and can thus afford to cooperate
fully. It would be unrealistic to expect all potential witnesses to be
willing (or even able) to devote the tremendous amount of time
necessary to make their testimony meaningful without compensating
them for their lost time. Thus, payments to fact witnesses may be
necessary to provide those witnesses with the proper incentive to
prepare for their testimony in a thorough manner.
Payments to fact witnesses are also justifiable on fairness grounds.
A conscientious witness may devote a large amount of time preparing
to testify. Wholly separate from the question of giving the witness the
incentive to prepare properly, there is also the question of what is the
fair and equitable thing to do. Our court system is an instrument of
justice; to compel people to provide testimony that will enable others
to be compensated for their
60 wrongs while denying those witnesses
compensation seems unjust.

Accrued Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Prime Retail, Inc., No. CIV-99-2573, 2000 WL 976800, at *2-3 & n.3
(D. Md. June 19, 2000) (discussing California and Maryland law); Wagner v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn
Loeb Inc., 646 F. Supp. 643, 656, 659-60 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (disqualifying a lawyer who participated
in his client's scheme to offer a witness a contingent fee); Commonwealth v. Miranda, 934 N.E.2d
222, 231-32 (Mass. 2010) (announcing that prosecutors may not offer monetary rewards to
witnesses contingent on defendants' convictions); Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 984 N.E.2d
909, 912 (N.Y. 2013); Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v, Sheatsley, 452 S.E.2d 75,
80 (W. Va. 1994) (applying DR 7-109(C), a predecessor to Model Rule 3.4(b)).
58. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.4(b) & cmt. 3 (2013).
59. Id.
60. Kinsler & Colton, supranote 22, at 429.
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The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility ("Standing Committee") filled the
Model Rule 3.4(b) gap in August 1996, when it issued Formal Opinion
96-402.61 In Formal Opinion 96-402, the Standing Committee was asked
whether, under Model Rule 3.4(b), it was "proper for a lawyer to
compensate a non-expert witness for the reasonable value of time
expended by the witness while preparing for or giving testimony at a
deposition or at a trial. 62 In answering this question affirmatively, the
Standing Committee observed that the precursor to Model Rule 3.4,
DR 7-109 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 expressly
permitted the payment of "[r]easonable compensation to a witness for
his loss of time in attending or testifying," and there was nothing in the
history of Model Rule 3.4(b) that indicated that the drafters of the Model
Rules intended to eliminate this principle. 64 In addition, the Standing
Committee noted that compensating witnesses for time spent attending
trials, hearings, and other proceedings was authorized by some statutes
and cases.65 The Standing Committee therefore concluded that Model
Rule 3.4(b) does not prohibit lawyers from paying fact witnesses for
lost time.66
Having determined that it was permissible for lawyers to
compensate fact witnesses for time spent attending depositions and
trials, the Standing Committee saw no reason to distinguish a lawyer:
compensating a witness for time spent in pretrial interviews with the
lawyer in preparation for testifying, as long as the lawyer makes it
clear to the witness that the payment is not being made for the
substance (or efficacy) of the witness's
testimony or as an inducement
67
to the witness to "tell the truth."
The Standing Committee further concluded that fact witnesses may be
compensated for time spent reading and researching records that are
germane to their testimony, provided such compensation is not barred by
the law of the jurisdiction.68
Formal Opinion 96-402 does not, however, grant lawyers carte
blanche to pay fact witnesses for time spent testifying or preparing to do
61. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-402 (1996) [hereinafter
ABA Formal Op. 96-402].
62. Id.
63.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSBILITY DR 7-109 (1969).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supranote 61, n.1 (quoting DR 7-109(C)(2)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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69

Rather, a witness's compensation "must be reasonable, so as to
avoid affecting, even unintentionally, the content of the witness's
testimony., 70 Weighing reasonableness may or may not be an easy task:
so.

What is a reasonable amount [of compensation] is relatively easy to
determine in situations where the witness can demonstrate to the
lawyer that he has sustained a direct loss of income because of his time
away from work-as, for example, [the] loss of hourly wages or
professional fees. In situations, however, where the witness has not
sustained any direct loss of income in connection with giving, or
preparing to give, testimony-as, for example, where the witness is
retired or unemployed-the lawyer must determine the reasonable
71
value of the witness's time based on all relevant circumstances.

Once that determination has been made, however, nothing in the Model
Rules prevents lawyers from compensating fact witnesses for their time
spent testifying or preparing to testify.72
The positions outlined in Formal Opinion 96-402 represent the
majority rule.73 Some courts and professional authorities, however, have
declined to allow lawyers to compensate fact witnesses for preparation
time, instead limiting payment for lost time to actual attendance at a
deposition, hearing, or trial.74 The Pennsylvania Bar Association has

observed that the Pennsylvania version of Model Rule 3.4(b)(2), which
expressly permits a lawyer to pay "reasonable compensation to a witness

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Chicago Ins. Co. v. Capwill, No. 1:01cv2588, 2011 WL 6181337, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 13, 2011); Prasad v. MML Inv. Servs., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 380, 2004 WL 1151735, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004) (citing ABA Formal Op. 96-402, among other authorities); Curley v. N.
Am. Man Boy Love Ass'n, No. Civ.A. 00-10956, 2003 WL 21696550, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 31,
2003) (quoting ABA Formal Op. 96-402); Mich. First Credit Union v. Al Long Ford, Inc., Docket
No. 291146, 2010 WL 5129890, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2010); Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm., Op. 93-2 (1993) [hereinafter Alaska Eth. Op. 93-2]; Ariz. State Bar Comm. on the Rules on
Ethics, Op. 97-07 (1997) [hereinafter Ariz. Op. 97-07]; Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l
Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1997-149 (1997) [hereinafter Cal. Op. 1997-149]; Colo. Bar
Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 103 (1998); Conn. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof l Ethics, Informal
Op. 92-30 (1992); Del. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 2003-3 (2003) [hereinafter
Del. Op. 2003-3]; Ill. State Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, Op. 87-5 (1988); Ky. Bar
Ass'n, Ethics Op. KBA E-400 (1997); Mass. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 91-3 (1991);
N.Y. Op. 668, supra note 21.
74. See, e.g., Rocheux Int'l of N.J., Inc, v. U.S. Merch. Fin. Grp., Inc., Civ. No. 06-6147,
2009 WL 3246837, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009) (describing this approach as the common law rule);
McIntosh v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., Civ. Action No. l:06CV1080, 2008 WL 941640, at *2
(S.D. Miss. Apr. 4, 2008) (citing Miss. Bar, Ethics Op. No. 145 (1988)); Phila. Bar Ass'n Prof l
Guidance Comm., Ethics Op. 94-27 (1994).
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for the witness' loss of time in attending or testifying," ' 5 can be read to
disfavor compensation to non-expert witnesses for the time invested in
preparing for testimony, but has neither approved nor disapproved of the
practice. 76 In other words, while Formal Opinion 96-402 represents the
majority position, that approach is not unanimous.
The challenge for lawyers and courts in most cases is evaluating the
reasonableness of witnesses' compensation and expenses. Judging the
reasonableness of expenses is fairly easy: what was the actual cost
incurred by the witness? The fact that a more frugal witness might have
incurred expenses lower than those that a particular witness actually
incurred does not make the latter's expenses unreasonable. Nor does
providing a witness with some level of comfort or convenience in
connection with her service necessarily transform an expense
reimbursement into an improper inducement. For example, paying for a
witness to fly first class from Los Angeles to New York rather than
making the witness fly coach should be considered perfectly
reasonable.7 7 Lodging a fact witness in a nice hotel rather than
housing the witness in a lower-cost hotel is similarly reasonable. 78 For
that matter, it will be a rare case in which a witness's expense
reimbursement will be so generous or unusual that it will constitute an
impermissible inducement.
With respect to witness compensation, reasonableness requires a
logical relationship between the amount paid to the witness and the time
the witness spent preparing to testify and appearing. 79 The closer a
witness's compensation comes to approximating her direct loss of
income, the more likely it is to be found reasonable. 80 In contrast,
compensation that is disproportionate to the time on the case spent by
the witness is potentially troubling, as a recent New York case, Caldwell
82
8
v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 1 somewhat awkwardly illustrates.
Plaintiff Bessie Caldwell tripped and injured herself while walking
her dog. 83 She sued Communications Specialists, Inc. ("CSI"), which
75. PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b)(2) (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Pa. Bar Ass'n, Op. 95-126 A-B (1996).
77.

RoY D. SIMON, SIMON'S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED

892 (2013) ("Whether a lawyer flies a witness first class or coach, or puts the witness up in a fivestar hotel or a Motel 6, should not be the determinant of whether the related expenses are
'reasonable."').
78. Id.
79. Curley v. N. Am. Man Boy Love Ass'n, No. Civ.A. 00-10956, 2003 WL 21696550, at *5
(D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2003).
80. ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supra note 61.
81. 984 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 2013).
82. Id. at 911-12.
83. Id. at 911.
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had been working on the street in the area where she fell. 84 In its
defense, CSI subpoenaed the physician who had treated Caldwell in the
hospital emergency room and who, when recording her medical history,
had noted that she had tripped over her dog. 85 The doctor testified
consistently with his note on direct examination.86 On cross examination
by Caldwell's lawyer, the doctor testified that CSI had paid him $10,000
for appearing and testifying.8 7 This dwarfed the statutory witness fee of
$15 per day and $0.23 per mile to which the doctor was entitled. 88 The
doctor denied that the payment influenced his testimony; he testified
only to his note in the emergency room record and he offered no medical
opinions.8 9 Caldwell asked the court to strike the doctor's testimony or
issue a curative instruction or a jury charge regarding monetary
influence. 90 CSI argued that there was nothing wrong with paying a fact
witness for time missed from work. 9' The court opted to allow the
parties to argue the doctor's compensation in their summations as long
as they did not specifically refer to the witness fee statute.9 2 The court
also gave a general bias instruction.9 3
The jury returned a verdict for CSI and Caldwell appealed. 94 The
Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in
allowing the doctor's testimony, and that, while the trial court should
have better instructed the jury on bias, that error was harmless. 95
Caldwell then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.96
Although the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the Appellate
Division on the basis that any trial court error was harmless, the court
was disturbed by the fact that CSI paid the doctor $10,000 for one hour
of testimony. 97 It probably did not help that CSI did not attempt to
justify the amount of the payment in the Court of Appeals.9 8

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 911-12.
Id. at912.
See id.
Id. at 913.
Id.
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The Caldwell court observed that the doctor had received a
substantial payment for minimal testimony. 99 This was deeply troubling
because payments to fact witnesses that are "exorbitant as compared to
the amount of time the witness spends away from work or business,
create an unflattering intimation that the testimony is being bought or, at
the very least, has been unconsciously influenced by the compensation
provided." 100 Although statutory witness fees are merely compensatory
minimums, such that Caldwell could not win her argument that the
doctor was entitled to nothing more than $15 plus mileage, the doctor's
10
grossly disproportionate witness fee was hard for the court to swallow. 1
The court specifically noted that "the distinction between paying a fact
witness for time and reasonable
witness for testimony and paying a fact
02
blurred."'
become
easily
can
expenses
CSI was almost certainly spared a new trial by the limitation of the
10 3
doctor's testimony to what he wrote in Caldwell's medical record.
There was no opportunity for the doctor to tailor his testimony to benefit
CSI. 104 It is a stretch even to think that might have been necessary, since,
in a trip-and-fall case, the plaintiffs admission that she stumbled10 5over
her own dog is about as good as it gets from a defense perspective.
It appears from the Appellate Division opinion that CSI paid the
doctor a fee close to that which he would charge if he appeared as an
expert witness. 10 6 The problem with that approach is that the doctor did
not testify as an expert witness; he appeared at trial in order to
regurgitate his note in the plaintiffs medical record.10 7 Furthermore,
99. Id.at 912.
100. Id.
101. Id.at912-13.
102. Id.at 913.
103. See id.
at912.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 911. It is easy to craft a hypothetical problem with what would likely be a very
different outcome simply by changing a few facts. Assume that the doctor did not record Caldwell's
admission about tripping over her dog in the medical history he took from her. Instead, he is called
as a witness at trial and testifies that Caldwell admitted stumbling over her dog but he did not record
it in his notes. Caldwell's statement about stumbling over her dog comes into evidence as an
admission against interest or as a statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment. See FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2), 803(4) (demarking statements that are covered by the hearsay rule, and listing the
exceptions to that rule). In our hypothetical case, the $10,000 payment to the doctor arguably takes
on the appearance of an improper inducement to a witness or, to put it slightly differently, the
$10,000 at least superficially appears to be payment for the content or substance of the doctor's
testimony rather than compensation for his lost time. The question would then become the remedy
to be afforded Caldwell, if any, with potential consequences for the defense lawyers and doctor to
follow.
106. Caldwell v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 925 N.Y.S.2d 103, 108 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011), aft'd,
984 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 2013).
107. Caldwell, 984 N.E.2d at 911.
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courts generally view treating physicians as fact witnesses, rather than as
expert witnesses.' 0 8 A better argument for CSI might have been that it
was compensating the doctor for his time away from his practice. This
theory at least has legs; the doctor testified on cross examination that
when he testified as an expert in other cases his fees were a substitute for
the fees he would have earned if he was instead seeing patients or
performing surgery. 0 9 By extension, then, although he was a fact
witness in Caldwell's case, paying him a fee commensurate with the fee
he would have charged as an expert witness was reasonable because it
simply compensated him for his lost time. But even then, the $10,000
witness fee was so disproportionate to the time the doctor spent
testifying-testimony that required no preparation-that justifying the
amount was effectively impossible.110
Finally, for now, there is the question of reasonable compensation
for fact witnesses who are retired or unemployed. One ethics body has
suggested that compensating a retired former employee of a party for
time spent testifying or preparing to testify may be improper because the
former employee would not sustain "any direct loss of income" in
serving as a fact witness."' But a fact witness's retirement or
unemployment does not render his or her time valueless. 12 Everyone's
time is worth something. 1 3 For that reason, the better view is that retired
and unemployed fact witnesses are entitled to reasonable compensation
for time spent testifying or preparing to testify. 114 The amounts to be
paid to such witnesses generally do, however, require closer
consideration than when, say, a fact witness employed by a non-party is
being reimbursed for lost wages." 5 Even so, paying a retired or
unemployed witness an hourly rate approximating that which they last
earned in their most recent employment should generally pass muster. 16
108. Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REV.
909, 940 (2000).
109. Caldwell, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
110. See Caldwell, 984 N.E.2d at 913.
11. Del. Op. 2003-3, supra note 73.
112. N.Y. Op. 668, supra note 21 (stating that "the fact that an individual may perform duties
for the attorney on his or her own time or may currently be unemployed does not necessitate a
finding that the individual is not entitled to receive compensation").
113. United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 39 (1stCir. 2001) (quoting the district court in ruling
from the bench).
114. ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supra note 61; Cal. Op. 1997-149, supra note 73; N.Y. Op. 668,
supra note 21; see, e.g., Davis, 261 F.3d at 39 (approving payment of modest hourly rate to an
elderly, unemployed fact witness).
115. N.Y. Op. 668, supra note 21.
116. Cal. Op. 1997-149, supra note 73; Compensation of Fact Witnesses: Rule 3.4(b) of the
N.H. Rules of Professional Conduct, N.H. BAR ASS'N ETHics CoMM. (Oct. 18, 1992),
http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/PEAI 0-92.pdf.
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B. CaliforniaRule of ProfessionalConduct 5-310
California has not adopted the Model Rules, although it is gradually
moving toward doing so." t 7 California governs witness compensation

under California Rule of Professional Conduct 5-310, which provides:
A member shall not:
(B) Directly or indirectly pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment
of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the
witness's testimony or the outcome of the case. Except where
prohibited by law, a member may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in
the payment of:
(1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or
testifying.
(2) Reasonable compensation to a witness for loss of time in attending
or testifying.
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert
witness. 118
California Rule 5-310(B) is nearly identical to DR 7-109(C) of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was the precursor to
Model Rule 3.4(b)." 9
There is a dearth of authority on Rule 5-310(B), most likely due to
its overall clarity. To the extent Rule 5-310(B) is uncertain, the
California State Bar's Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct, known to California lawyers as COPRAC,
tried to fill any gaps in formal ethics opinion 1997-149.20 In that
opinion, the committee concluded that it is appropriate:
to compensate a witness for otherwise uncompensated time necessary
for preparation for or testifying at deposition or trial, as long as the
compensation is reasonable in conformance with rule 5-310(B), does
not violate applicable law, and is not paid to a witness contingent upon
the content of the witness' testimony or the outcome of the case.121
Those principles apply regardless of whether a witness "is currently
employed, unemployed, retired, suspended or in any other
employment status.' 22
117. See, e.g., Marcellus A. McRae & Kim Nortman, Your Witness, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2012, at
31, 32 (indicating that California has adopted the ABA's interpretation of Model Rule 3.4(b)).
118.

CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 5-310(B) (2013).

119. Cal. Op. 1997-149, supra note 73.
120. Id.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
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Reasonableness for Rule 5-310(B) purposes pivots on the
circumstances. 123 Possible objective bases for evaluating the
reasonableness of a fact witness's compensation under Rule 5-310(B)
include the witness's rate of pay if she is currently employed, what the
witness last earned if she is unemployed or retired,124or what others earn in
comparable jobs, activities, occupations, or roles.
C. The FederalAnti-Bribery or Anti-Gratuity Statute
The propriety of fact witness compensation is not solely a
professional responsibility issue. The Model Rule 3.4(b) reference to
inducements to witnesses that are prohibited by law plainly signals that
fact. 125 For example, § 201(c)(2) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, 12 6 which is
commonly referred to as the federal anti-bribery or anti-gratuity statute,
provides that:
[w]hoever... directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything
of value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or
affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, any committee or
either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission,
or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence
or take 1testimony
shall be fined or imprisoned for up to two years,
27
or both.

Notably, "whoever" as used in the statute does not include federal
prosecutors functioning within the scope of their office who pay
cooperating witnesses, even when the payments are solely for the
witnesses' testimony, "so long as the payment is not for or because
of any corruption of the truth of testimony."' 128 Other lawyers and
parties litigating in federal courts, however, are not expressly afforded
such leeway.129
123.
124.
125.
"offer an

See id.
See id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2013) (stating that a lawyer shall not
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law").
126. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2006).
127. Id.
128. United States v. Anty, 203 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2000); see also United States v.
Ihnatenko, 482 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that government can pay the fees of a
witness, "so long as the payment does not recompense any corruption of the truth of testimony");
United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 30 F. App'x 803, 807-08 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Albanese, 195 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138, 144-45 (5th
Cir. 1999).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (recognizing that a person can be charged with bribery for
providing money to a witness without finding any type of corrupt motivation).
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Section 201(c)(2) by its terms does not prohibit payments to fact
witnesses made for purposes other than the fact or content of their
testimony. 30 Or, stated positively, the statute permits lawyers and
parties to compensate fact witnesses for time lost to testifying.' 3' This
limit on § 201(c)(2)'s otherwise long reach is made manifest in 18
U.S.C. § 201(d), which states that § 201(c)(2) does not "prohibit the
payment.., of witness fees provided by law, or the payment, by the
party upon whose behalf a witness is called.., of the reasonable cost of
travel and subsistence incurred and the reasonable value of time lost in
attendance at any such trial, hearing, or proceeding."' 32 Furthermore, and
consistent with these positions, nothing in § 201(c)(2) establishes that a
person violates the law by paying fact witnesses for time spent in
legitimate non-testimonial activities, such as meeting with counsel for a
party or reviewing documents in preparation for testifying. 33 Payment
for such activities is allowable because it is not extended "for or because
of [the] testimony" of the witness. 34 Indeed, the weight of authority
holds that witnesses' time spent on legitimate non-testimonial activities
is permitted under the anti-gratuity statute, provided the amount of
compensation is reasonable. 13
130. See id.(referring to payments or similar promises "foror because of the testimony" of a
witness (emphasis added)).
131. Aristocrat Techs. v. Int'l Game Tech., No. C-06-03717, 2010 WL 2595151, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. June 28, 2010).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 201(d).
133. Centennial Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Axa Re Vie, 193 F.R.D. 671,682 (D. Kan. 2000).
134. Consol. Rail Corp. v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 09-cv-10179, 2012 WL 511572, at *13
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); Centennial Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 193
F.R.D. at 681.
135. See, e.g., Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 924 F. Supp. 2d 183, 194
(D.D.C. 2013) (allowing compensation of fact witness for "countless hours" spent assisting counsel
in discovery and trial preparation); Consol. Rail Corp., 2012 WL 511572, at *8 (citing ABA Formal
Op. 95-402); Chicago Ins. Co. v. Capwill, No. 1:01cv2588, 2011 WL 6181337, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 13, 2011) ("It was unquestionably proper for plaintiff's counsel to provide payment equivalent
to [the witness's] salary for his time spent preparing for his deposition, reviewing his testimony and
traveling to and from deposition-related appointments. The payment for [the witness's] time being
deposed [was] also proper."); United States v. Kobagaya, Crim. Action No. 09-10005-01, 2011 WL
1466475, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 18, 2011) (stating that it is "entirely reasonable to compensate a
witness for time and expenses in meeting with a government attorney to prepare for trial as long as
the amounts paid are reasonable"); Prasad v. MML Inv. Servs., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 380, 2004 WL
1151735, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004) ("A witness may be compensated for the time spent
preparing to testify or otherwise consulting on a litigation matter in addition to the time spent
providing testimony in a deposition or at trial."); Centennial Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 193 F.R.D. at 682
(relying on ABA Formal Op. 96-402); In re Split Vein Coal Co., No. 1:03-BK-02974, 2013 WL
1934669, at *6 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. May 9, 2013) (quoting Centennial Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 193 F.R.D.
at 682). But see In re Complaint of PMD Enters., 215 F. Supp. 2d 519, 529-30 (D.N.J. 2002)
(limiting fact witness compensation to: (1) time lost in attending trial or testifying, and (2)
reasonable expenses incurred in attending trial or testifying).
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With § 201(d), as with ethics rules, the essential inquiry often is
whether a witness's compensation for litigation-related time is
reasonable. 3 6 To make this determination, a court must examine the
circumstances of the particular case. 137 Among the factors a court may
consider when evaluating the reasonableness of a witness's
compensation are the hourly rate paid to the witness and the number of
hours spent by the witness in connection with the litigation.'38 This is
always a case-specific inquiry; there is no precise or uniform measure
39
of reasonableness. 1
Finally, if a court determines that a fact witness's compensation
does not violate § 201 (c)(2), it necessarily determines in the process that
the lawyer who approved, acquiesced in, or orchestrated the payments
did not violate the Model Rule 3.4(b) prohibition on offering an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.14°
D. Summary and Synthesis
In summary, the majority rule holds that lawyers may compensate
fact witnesses for time spent testifying, preparing to testify, or otherwise
assisting in litigation, and may reimburse witnesses' related expenses,
provided the amounts paid are reasonable, are not conditioned on the act
of testifying or the content or substance of the witness's testimony, and
are not contingent upon the outcome of the litigation."4 Reasonable
compensation for time spent testifying, preparing to testify, or otherwise
assisting in litigation is not an inducement to a witness that is prohibited
by law within the meaning of Model Rule 3.4(b), 142 nor is it a violation
of the federal anti-gratuity
statute as interpreted by most courts to have
1 43
considered the issue.
The reasonableness of a witness's compensation is measured
objectively,' 44 or at least as objectively as possible on the facts
45
presented. Evaluating reasonableness requires case-specific inquiry.
The closer a witness's compensation comes to approximating her direct
loss of income, the more likely it is to be found reasonable. 46 Fact
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

CentennialMgmt. Servs., Inc., 193 F.R.D. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Id.
See id.
Id.at 682.
ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supra note 61; see also Cal. Op. 1997-149, supra note 73.
United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 38 n.31 (lst Cir. 2001).
See supranotes 128-42 and accompanying text.
Alaska Eth. Op. 93-2, supranote 73, at n.2.
Ariz. Op. 97-07, supra note 73.
ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supranote 61.
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witnesses whose agreed compensation cannot be shown to be reasonable
should not necessarily be denied all payment for their lost time. 147 It may
be possible to lower or restructure a witness's compensation to make it
limit a witness to the recovery
reasonable. 48 Alternatively, a court may
149
of statutory witness fees and expenses.
Courts may consider a number of factors in making reasonableness
determinations, including: (1) the time spent by the witness in
connection with the litigation; (2) the hourly rate paid to the witness by
her employer if the witness is currently employed; (3) the witness's
regular fees or regular hourly rates if the witness is self-employed;
(4) the witness's most recent wages or earnings, or what others earn for
comparable activities, if the witness is unemployed or retired; (5) the
witness's special qualifications, such as experience, expertise, or
specialized knowledge that cannot practicably be supplied by others;
(6) the value of opportunities or alternative employment that a witness
must forego to participate in the litigation, whether because of the time
commitment required or because of other factors; (7) the inconvenience
or hardship experienced by the witness as a result of her involvement in
the litigation, which may or may not overlap with the preceding element;
(8) the witness's occupation, trade, or profession, which, again, may or
may not intersect with some of the prior factors; and (9) practical
constraints, such as whether the witness has unique factual knowledge or
is beyond the court's subpoena power.15 ° This list is not exhaustive and
other considerations may be relevant in particular cases.
The reasonableness of witnesses' expenses is seldom an issue.
The reimbursement of a person's actual expenses is almost
uniformly proper.' 5'
1II.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

Lawyers who are contemplating paying fact witnesses for time lost
to testifying or to preparation for testifying are challenged by several
factors when formulating compensation arrangements. For one thing, the
majority rule notwithstanding, there is variation among jurisdictions in
terms of what witness compensation is permissible.15 ' For another thing,
147. In re Split Vein Coal Co., No. 1:03-BK-02974, 2013 WL 1934669, at *6-7 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. May 9, 2013).
148. Id.

149.
150.
151.
152.
(limiting

See id. (calculating a witness's administrative claim in a bankruptcy case).
See, e.g., Ariz. Op. 97-07, supra note 73; ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supra note 61.
SIMON, supranote 77, at 892.
See, e.g., In re Complaint of PMD Enters. Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 519, 529-30 (D.N.J. 2002)
fact witness compensation to time lost in attending trial or testifying and reasonable
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different courts may have significantly different perspectives on the
reasonableness of fact witnesses' compensation even when the amounts
at issue or the witnesses' status's or roles are very similar.' 53 As one
author and veteran trial lawyer has observed, only half-joking, the
"reasonable" value of a witness's lost time "means whatever the
individual judge who is looking at your individual facts thinks it
means."' 154 Finally, while some compensation arrangements are clearly
improper and should have been so recognized before they were entered
into, as where a witness is to be paid for her testimony,155 in other cases,
subtle or unappreciated factual differences may lead to very different
results. 56 Nonetheless, it is helpful to examine some cases in which
courts either approved or disapproved of witnesses' compensation in an
effort to better understand how related controversies play out.
A.

Cases Approving Fact Witnesses' Compensation

In Prasadv. MML Investor Services, Inc.,' 57 the plaintiffs sought to
vacate a National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
arbitration award in favor of the defendant, MML Investor Services, Inc.
("MMLISI"). 158 They alleged in the arbitration case that they were
defrauded in a Ponzi scheme operated by a former MMLISI
representative, Nagajara Thayagarajan.' 5 9 One of the witnesses who
testified for MMLISI in the arbitration was Stanley Farr, a former
compliance officer with the firm, who, while still employed by MMLISI,
had investigated Thayagarajan's alleged misconduct. 6 ° At the time he
testified, Farr was self-employed as a compliance consultant and charged
his clients at a rate of $125 per hour. 16 1 After Farr's third day of
testimony in the arbitration, the plaintiffs complained to the arbitrators
that Farr was receiving "illegal compensation" as a fact witness and that
the time he "spent in 'witness prep' amounted to witness tampering and

expenses incurred in attending trial or testifying); Goldstein v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., No.
Civ. 95-2410, 1997 WL 580599, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1997) (taking the same approach).
153. Robert L. Byman, With Fact Witnesses, Do You Get What You Pay For?, NAT'L L.J. &
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 29, 2012, at 22, 22.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Golden Door Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass'n,
865 F. Supp. 1516, 1521, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (sanctioning insurer for witness payments that
"unquestionably violated the very heart of the integrity of the justice system").
156. Byman, supranote 153.
157. No. 04 Civ. 380, 2004 WL 1151735 (S.D.N.Y. May 24,2004).
158. Id at *2-3.
159. Id. at *1.
160. Id.
161. Id. at*2.
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constituted subornation of perjury.' 62 The arbitration panel allowed the
plaintiffs to recall Farr as a witness and question him regarding his
compensation by MMLISI 163
Farr testified that MMLISI had reimbursed him for his time spent
on the arbitration at an hourly rate of $125, the same rate he charged
clients as a self-employed consultant.' 64 He explained that he was not
paid to testify in any particular manner. 165 He also testified that while he
did not prepare any witnesses to testify in the arbitration proceeding, he
166
was present when MMLISI's lawyers prepared other witnesses.
Finally, Farr's invoices to MMLISI indicated that he was also
reimbursed 67for his travel expenses, including air fare, car rental, hotels,
and meals. 1
At the close of Farr's testimony, the plaintiffs moved to strike the
testimony of all of MMLISI's witnesses on the basis that MMLISI had
improperly paid Farr for his testimony and time. 168 After due
consideration, the arbitrators denied the plaintiffs' motion to strike the
witnesses' testimony, and further denied the plaintiffs' claims against
MMLISI in their entirety, without explaining the bases for their
decisions. 169 The plaintiffs then petitioned a New York federal court to
vacate the arbitration award. 170
In the district court, the plaintiffs asserted that the arbitration panel
acted in manifest disregard of the law when it declined to strike the
witnesses' testimony.' 71 The plaintiffs did not challenge the
reasonableness of Farr's expenses, nor did they contend that he was paid
for anything other than his time and expenses. 172 Rather, they argued it
was improper for MMLISI to have paid Farr to participate in witness
preparation. 173 The plaintiffs further complained that MMLISI did not
reveal Farr's compensation or services before they were exposed on
' 74
cross examination, a lapse the plaintiffs characterized as "troubling.'
Their arguments did not impress the court. As the court explained:

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id at *5.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A witness may be compensated for the time spent preparing to
testify or otherwise consulting on a litigation matter in addition to time
spent testifying in a deposition or at trial.
That a fact witness has been retained to act as a litigation consultant
does not, in and of itself, appear to be improper, absent some
indication that the retention was designed as a financial inducement or
as a method to secure the cooperation of a hostile witness, or was
otherwise improper. Although Farr was retained by MMLISI after he
was approached by [the plaintiffs] to testify as a witness, that fact
alone is insufficient to establish that MMLISI's retention of his
services as a consultant was improper as a matter of law, particularly in
view of Farr's testimony that he was initially contacted by MMLISI's
counsel regarding [the plaintiffs']
claims.., long before he was
75
approached by [the plaintiffs]. 1
Therefore, the plaintiffs could not show that Farr's compensation by
MMLISI violated any governing legal principles. 76 The amount of
Farr's compensation certainly did not concern the court. 17 7 Indeed, the
fact that MMLISI paid Farr the same rate he charged his clients as
a self-employed compliance
consultant was a compelling display
78
of reasonableness. 1
Finally, while the court acknowledged that a lawyer's or witness's
failure to timely divulge the witness's compensation may sometimes be
"troubling," 179 this was not such a case.180 Contrary to the plaintiffs'
assertion that the nature of Farr's relationship with MMLISI surfaced for
the first time on cross examination, Farr testified during his first day of
direct examination that he had located and interviewed a number of
potential witnesses at the request of MIMLISI's counsel. 18' At that time,
he and MMLISI's counsel also made clear that
he was being paid for his
82
time spent in connection with the arbitration. 1
To the extent the plaintiffs were upset by Farr being present when
MMLISI's counsel met with other witnesses, they could cite no
authority for the proposition that lawyers are prohibited from meeting
with multiple witnesses at the same time. 8 3 The plaintiffs offered no
evidence to support their allegations of witness tampering.' 84
175. Id.at *6 (citations omitted).

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.at *7.
See id.
Id.
Id.

180. Id.
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Accordingly, the court in Prasad confirmed the arbitration award in
favor of MMLISI. 185
Prasadillustrates at least two key points for lawyers. First, it shows
the importance of linking fact witnesses' compensation to their direct
losses of income. 186 The tighter the linkage between a witness's lost
income and the payments to the witness, the greater the probability that
1 87
the court will hold the witness's compensation to be reasonable.
Second, the decision highlights the wisdom of disclosing compensation
arrangements with witnesses. 88 In fact, the disclosure in Prasadmight
have been made earlier. 189 Many prudent lawyers disclose fact
witnesses' compensation in discovery at a time when an opponent can
explore the subject if it wishes, but disclosure on direct examination in a
proceeding presents a last clear chance to avoid potential problems.'9°
ConsolidatedRail Corp. v. CSX Transportation,Inc.' 91 was a suit
over railroad trackage rights brought by Consolidated Rail Corp.
("Conrail") and another railroad, Norfolk Southern. 92 Paul Carey
worked for Conrail until he retired in 1999, at which time he entered into
a consulting agreement with Conrail concerning anticipated regulatory
actions and litigation in which his experience and knowledge would be
valuable. 193 The agreement, which had a one-year term and expired in
2000, provided that Conrail would pay Carey $85 per 94hour for his
services, plus reimburse him for travel and other expenses. 1
In September 2009, the plaintiffs and their counsel at Pepper
Hamilton LLP ("Pepper") asked Carey to assist them in this case.' 95
Interestingly, they had identified him in their initial disclosures as a
185. Id. at *7-8.
186. See id. at *7.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. See Hardaway, supra note 17, at 53 ("Disclose early and often. Specifically, be sure to
accurately and timely respond to discovery requests concerning the employment status and
compensation of all fact witnesses."); Villa, supra note 12, at 114 ("Inform opposing counsel,
preferably in writing, of the terms of your agreement with your [fact] witness.").
190. See, e.g., United States v. Cinergy Corp., No. 1:99-cv-1693, 2008 WL 7679914, at *10-15
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 18, 2008) (ordering a new trial where defense counsel did not reveal fact witness's
compensation on direct examination and allegedly misled jury about witness's compensation, and
witness did not reveal employment or compensation when testifying). But cf Armenian Assembly
of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 924 F. Supp. 2d 183, 192-95 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding no basis to hold that
witness had to disclose compensation and pointing out that the plaintiffs questioning failed to
reveal the compensation, not because the witness was dishonest, but because the questions were not
sufficiently specific).
191. No. 09-cv- 10179, 2012 WL 511572 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2012).
192. Id. at *1.
193. Id. at *3.
194. Id.
195. Id. at *4.
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possible fact witness several months earlier, and the defendant had
already indicated its intent to depose him based on his identification in
the plaintiffs' disclosures. 196 Carey agreed to assist the plaintiffs and he
soon traveled to Detroit to inspect the tracks at issue and to meet with
the plaintiffs' counsel. 197 Approximately two weeks later, Laurence
Shiekman of Pepper formally retained Carey as a consultant to assist the
firm in preparing the plaintiffs' case, with the possibility of his
testimony at trial left open. 98 In the letter engaging Carey as a
consultant, Shiekman indicated that Conrail would pay Carey for his
services directly at the same rate specified in his earlier consulting
agreement. 199 Shortly thereafter, a Conrail lawyer, Jonathan Broder,
agreed to increase Carey's rate to $125 per hour when Carey reported
200
that he had done some unrelated consulting work at that higher rate.
Carey eventually consulted on the matter for just over thirty hours, for
which Conrail owed him slightly more than $4000. °1
The defendant deposed Carey in December 2009.202 The
defendant's lawyer asked Carey if he was being compensated for his
deposition appearance.2 3 Carey said he was and defense counsel
attempted to inquire further.20 4 The plaintiffs' lawyer, Matthew Lund,
halted further questioning on the basis that Carey's consulting agreement
was confidential. 20 5 After some motion practice in which the details of
Carey's consulting arrangement and compensation were revealed,
Carey's deposition continued pursuant to court order.20 6 Carey testified
regarding his consulting arrangement, although he was a little uncertain
about who had engaged him (Conrail versus Pepper) and the specific
agreement governing his consultancy (the 1999 agreement or
Shiekman's letter).20 7 When trial finally drew near, the defendant moved
to exclude Carey's testimony because he was "an improperly paid fact
witness and charged an unreasonable rate of $125 per hour for his time
providing factual testimony., 20 8 Pushing back, the plaintiffs argued that
they did not pay Carey for his testimony and that he was reasonably
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.
Id.at
Id.
Id
Id.
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at

*7.
*4.

*5.
*5-7.
*8.
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compensated for his expenses and time lost while meeting with them,
reviewing documents, and being deposed.2 °9
The district court began its analysis by noting that public policy
forbids lawyers and others from compensating fact witnesses beyond the
reasonable value of their time lost and reasonable expenses. 21 ° Though
the federal anti-gratuity statute forbids the compensation of witnesses for
their testimony, the court recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) permits
payment for the "reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and
the reasonable value of time lost in attendance" at hearings, trials, or
proceedings. 21 ' The § 201(d) exception extends to time fact witnesses
spend reviewing documents and meeting with lawyers. 21 2 According to
the ConsolidatedRail court, a lawyer acting on a client's behalf may pay
a fact witness for time spent preparing for or attending a deposition or
trial as long as the lawyer does not condition payment on the content of
the witness's testimony.21 3
The district court easily concluded that Carey's consulting
arrangement was ethical under Model Rule 3.4(b).21 4 The defendant,
however, argued that the plaintiffs' initial attempt to conceal the
consulting agreement was a strong indicator of improper conduct. 21 5 The
court agreed that the plaintiffs' lawyers "displayed some troubling
behavior" in resisting discovery of Carey's consulting arrangements, but
noted that: (1) Lund's refusal to permit Carey to be questioned on the
subject was based on his misunderstanding of the work product doctrine;
and (2) neither Carey nor the plaintiffs' lawyers attempted to hide the
fact that Carey was a paid consultant. 21 6 Those facts distinguished this
case from other cases in which courts had sanctioned parties or fact
witnesses who had allegedly acted in bad faith in trying to conceal
consulting relationships.21 7 While Carey had been unclear about the date
and some terms of his consulting agreement and who had retained him
as a consultant, it was probable that he was innocently confused or
mistaken.21 8 The court saw no reason to doubt his honesty since he had

209.
210.
211.
212.
402).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citing ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supra note 61, which the court misidentified as 95Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id. (citing NewYork v. Solvent Chem. Co., 166 F.R.D. 284, 290 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)).
See id. at*11-12.
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revealed his consulting relationship the first time he was asked about it
in his deposition.219
The defendant argued that the plaintiffs' retention of Carey as a
consultant after it had indicated its intention to depose him was further
evidence of improper conduct. 220 The court disagreed. 221 The plaintiffs
had identified Carey as a possible fact witness in their initial disclosures
before the defendant noticed his deposition, and Carey had previously
worked with Broder and Shiekman on Conrail matters.222 Thus, the fact
that the plaintiffs retained Carey as a consultant after his deposition
was noticed was not enough for the court to infer that his retention
223
was improper.
Of course, even assuming that the plaintiffs properly retained Carey
as a consultant, his compensation had to be reasonable "so as to avoid
224
affecting, even unintentionally, the content of [his] testimony.
Although there had been some disagreement in discovery about Carey's
hourly rate ($85 versus $125), which the defendant asserted was a
deceptive smokescreen, the court attributed any confusion to the rate
increase granted by Broder after Shiekman retained Carey, and to
confusion between Broder and the lawyers at Pepper. 22 5 Given that the
$125 hourly rate that Conrail paid to Carey matched that which he had
charged another client for consulting work, it did not appear to be
excessive or unreasonable.2 26
In light of all the evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had not paid Carey for or because of his testimony, and thus that they
had not violated the federal anti-gratuity statute. 2 7 To the contrary, they
had reimbursed Carey's expenses and reasonably paid him for his lost
time.228 The court therefore declined to exclude Carey's testimony,
although it did permit the defendant to cross examine Carey on his
consulting agreements at trial.22 9
Consolidated Rail reflects some of the miscommunications,
misjudgments, and timing issues that can complicate litigation, such as
the plaintiffs identifying Carey as a fact witness before they retained him

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at*12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.(citing ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supra note 61).
Id.at *12-13.
Id.at*13.
See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2006), but not mentioning the statute).
Id.
Id.
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as a consultant, Lund mistakenly believing that Carey's consulting
relationship was immune from discovery as work product, the confusion
between Conrail's in-house counsel and its outside counsel, and Carey's
own uncertainty over the contours of his consulting relationship. 230 But
none of those stumbles left a mark because the plaintiffs paid Carey for
his lost time rather than for his testimony, Carey's compensation was
objectively reasonable, and Carey disclosed his consulting relationship
with the plaintiffs when he was asked about it at his deposition. 231 Long
story short, the plaintiffs, their lawyers, and Carey touched the key
points and acted in good faith-even if their actions or judgments
were imperfect.232
B. Cases Disapprovingof Fact Witnesses' Compensation
New York v. Solvent Chemical Co. 233 is regarded as a leading case

opposing fact witness compensation, though that is an ambitious
interpretation of the decision.234 In Solvent, the State of New York sued
a company named ICC Industrial, Inc. ("ICC") and other defendants for
environmental pollution at an industrial chemical facility in the town of
Niagara Falls, known as the Buffalo Avenue site. 35 The suit was filed in
1983, and in 1986, ICC and Solvent Chemical Company, Inc.
("Solvent") filed a variety of third-party claims.2 36 In 1995, discovery
finally focused on ICC's potential liability as an operator of the Buffalo
Avenue site or as the corporate parent of Solvent, which had run the
industrial chemical facility. 237 In turn, a dispute arose over ICC's

Eric Beu, who was an important fact
retention of its former employee 238
witness, as a litigation consultant.
In the 1970s, Beu was a vice president of both ICC and its whollyowned subsidiary, Dover Chemical Corp. ("Dover"). 239 He left ICC and
Dover in 1979 .240 He later brought an arbitration proceeding against ICC
related to his departure, which he lost. 24 1 Beu had not worked in the

230.

Id. at *11-13.

231.

Id.

232.
233.
234.

Seeid.at*13.
166 F.R.D. 284 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
Seeid. at 291-92.

235.

Id. at 285.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id. at 286.
See id.at 286-87.
Id.at 286.
Id.
Id.
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chemical industry since.242 In 1993, Dover filed a Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation,
and Liability Act
243
an
Ohio
federal
court
against several
("CERCLA")
action in
or operator of Dover's
defendants, including Beu as a former owner
2
facility in Dover, Ohio ("Dover litigation"). 44
When another defendant, Occidental Chemical Co. ("OCC"),
subpoenaed Beu for a deposition in this case in July 1995, ICC realized
that Beu possessed critical knowledge of Solvent's operations at the
Buffalo Avenue site and of ICC's relationship with Solvent.245 ICC's
internal documents relevant to Solvent's operations included numerous
memoranda to or from Beu, many of which bore his indecipherable
handwritten notes.2 46 ICC, Solvent, and Dover thus approached Beu
through his counsel in the Dover litigation and reached several
agreements with him.24 7 First, Dover settled with Beu in the Dover
litigation.248 Beu paid Dover $4000 and Dover promised to indemnify
him with respect to any claims against him by other parties in that
case. 249 Second, ICC and Solvent agreed not to sue Beu in the current
action.250 Third, ICC and Beu entered into a written consulting
agreement in the current case.251 Beu agreed to assist ICC and its
lawyers by reviewing and discussing with them documents relevant to
the litigation at a rate of $100 per hour plus expenses.252
Beu was deposed for three days in November 1995.253 Before his
deposition, neither ICC nor Solvent informed any of the other parties
about ICC's consulting agreement with Beu or its terms, although they
did tell them that lawyers from the firm representing Solvent would
represent Beu at his deposition.254 On the first day of his deposition, Beu
denied any relationships with ICC, Dover, or Solvent since leaving ICC
and Dover in 1979.255 Neither his lawyers nor the lawyers appearing for

242. Id.
243. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2006).
244. Solvent, 166 F.R.D. at 286.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 286-87.
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ICC and Solvent corrected his testimony. 6 On the third day of the
deposition, Beu was asked whether he had any consulting relationships
with any of the parties.25 7 He answered affirmatively and then explained
the terms of his consulting relationship and agreement, testified that he
had worked somewhere between twenty and fifty hours on the case,
explained that he did all of his work after he had been subpoenaed to
give his deposition, and said that he was not being paid for his
deposition time.25 8 Beu declined to answer questions regarding the exact
nature of his consulting work on the advice of his lawyer. 259 Beu also
refused to produce a copy of the consulting agreement and the invoices
for his time, based on his lawyer's assertion that it constituted work
product.260 A discovery dispute ensued.2 61
The court easily concluded that Beu's consulting agreement and
related documents were not immune from discovery as work product.26 2
As the court explained, work product protection must yield to conduct
by litigants or their lawyers that "erode[s] the integrity of the adversary
process," and here the conduct of ICC and Solvent and their lawyers
with respect to Beu had "threatened to undermine the integrity of the
adversary process. 263 In particular:
It is clear, first of all, that the agreements entered into by ICC, Solvent,
Dover, and Mr. Beu were designed to overcome the hostility between
Mr. Beu and ICC resulting from the dispute over the circumstances of
Mr. Beu's departure from ICC in 1979, and from the naming of Mr.
Beu as a defendant in the Dover litigation. ICC and Solvent purchased
Mr. Beu's cooperation in the instant case, by orchestrating the
settlement of Dover's claims against him in the Dover litigation, by
obtaining Dover's agreement to indemnify him with respect to any
claims made against him by other parties in that case, and by
undertaking not to sue him in the present action. Those actions were
the equivalent of making cash payments to Mr. Beu264as a means of
making him "sympathetic" and securing his testimony.
The court explained that there was nothing improper in ICC
reimbursing Beu for his travel expenses incurred in consulting with ICC,

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id.
Id.at287.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 287-88.
Id.at 289.
Id.
Id.
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or in ICC's payment of a reasonable hourly fee for his time. 265 But in
indemnifying Beu in connection with the Dover litigation and this case
"as a means of obtaining his cooperation as a fact witness, ICC and
Solvent went too far., 266 In addition, the circumstances surrounding
ICC's retention of Beu as a consultant were suspicious.

267

As the

court stated:
ICC must have been well aware, prior to OCC's serving of a subpoena
on Mr. Beu, that Mr. Beu was an extremely important fact witness in
this case. The company has been a defendant since the original
complaint was filed in 1983. But it was only after service of the
subpoena in July 1995-when it became clear that OCC and other
parties were intending to obtain both documents and testimony from
Mr. Beu-that ICC moved to acquire Mr. Beu's services as a
"litigation consultant." The timing of ICC's actions creates, in and of
itself, an appearance of impropriety that serves to further undermine
the company's claim of work product protection for the consulting
agreement and related materials. And ICC's identification of Mr. Beu
as a member of its trial team inevitably raises concerns as to whether
he can be counted on to testify fully and impartially on a key issue in
this case-the extent to which ICC was involved in the operations of
Solvent and the Buffalo Avenue
site at the time the site was owned
268
and/or operated by Solvent.
The court was also disturbed by the fact that no one among Beu, his
lawyers, ICC's lawyers, and Solvent's lawyers took the initiative to
disclose Beu's consulting arrangement.269 When asked on the first day of
his deposition whether he had any current relationship with ICC or
Solvent, Beu not only wrongly denied the existence of his consulting
relationship, but neither his lawyers nor ICC's or Solvent's counsel
corrected the record.27 °
Finally, the court shredded ICC for its "perturbing" reliance on the

work product doctrine to withhold Beu's consulting agreement. 27 ' The
court stated:
The basis for its claim of work product protection is that the agreement
"contains and reflects ICC's litigation strategy and the thoughts,
mental impressions and opinions of ICC's counsel." The court is at a

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id.at 289-90.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Id.

271.

Id.
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loss as to why ICC would incorporate such sensitive information in a
written contract with an important fact witness. It must have been
obvious at the time the contract was drafted that other parties to the
litigation would be disturbed by the existence of the agreement, and
would be likely to seek production of the document. It may be that the
agreement sets forth the contours, and even some details, of Mr. Beu's
responsibilities as a "litigation consultant," and that such provisions
might in themselves reveal something of ICC's litigation strategy. But
the impropriety of ICC's conduct in relation to Mr. Beu dictates that
the company must forfeit
any protection that it might otherwise claim
272
to such information.
The court ordered ICC to produce to the other parties copies of all
documents that Beu reviewed in his consulting, any documents or notes
that he prepared as a consultant, and all notes or other documents
reflecting communications with or by Beu.273 The court also ordered
ICC to produce Beu for further deposition at its expense, including
paying the fees of the moving parties' lawyers.274
At base, the Solvent court enforced something close to the common
271
law prohibition on paying fact witnesses for their testimony. 27 ICC and
Solvent might have insisted that they had simply paid Beu for his time
assisting them in the litigation, but that argument was doomed from the
get-go. Its fate was sealed by the settlement of the Dover litigation
claims against Beu and the indemnity agreements extended to Beu,
which appeared to be inducements to Beu to testify favorably for ICC
and Solvent.276 Those agreements rendered Beu's compensation
objectively unreasonable. 77 But even had ICC and Solvent merely paid
Beu for his time spent analyzing and explaining musty papers bearing
his name or handwriting, they still would have had no good arguments
for resisting discovery of his consulting agreement or related documents.
What the Solvent court clearly did not do was prohibit lawyers or
others from paying fact witnesses for their time spent testifying or
preparing to testify, or for otherwise assisting in preparing a case for
trial.278 To the contrary, the court emphasized that "there is nothing
improper about the payment of a reasonable hourly fee for the services

272. Id. (citations omitted).
273. Id. at 292.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 289.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. Id. (stating that there was "nothing improper in the reimbursement of expenses incurred
by Mr. Beu in travelling to New York to provide ICC with factual information, or in the payment of
a reasonable hourly fee for Mr. Beu's time").
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of a fact witness., 27 9 Lawyers who rely on Solvent in opposing fact
witnesses' compensation or seeking remedies for compensation
arrangements they consider to be improper should therefore be careful
not to overstate the holding.
Rocheux International of New Jersey, Inc. v. U.S. Merchants
Financial Group, Inc. 280 involved a contract dispute between Rocheux
International of New Jersey, Inc. ("Rocheux"), which was a distributor
of plastic materials, and several plastic product-packaging providers. 28'
The defendants alleged that a former employee of one of them, Jorge
Gutierrez, had approached Rocheux's lawyer, Brian McAlindin, and
offered to provide damaging testimony against the defendants in
exchange for a fee.282 McAlindin arranged to pay Gutierrez over $4000
for his testimony.283 McAlindin originally identified Gutierrez as a fact
witness, but, after the deadline for disclosing expert witnesses had
passed, he informed defense counsel that he would be eliciting expert
testimony from Gutierrez.284 As part of that expert witness disclosure,
McAlindin submitted an affidavit from Gutierrez, stating that the
defendant for which he once worked had changed data in its accounting
system and had engaged in other unethical business practices at its
CEO's direction.285
The defendants noticed Gutierrez's deposition.2 86 McAlindin then
informed them that Gutierrez would charge $1500 for his deposition
testimony. 287 The deposition proceeded and Gutierrez testified that
McAlindin had paid him more than $4000 to date, but that he understood
that fee to be payment for his consulting work, "specifically, his
communications with Rocheux's lawyers and reviewing his affidavit"
rather than his expert testimony.288 He testified that he had contacted
Rocheux's lawyers to tell them that he had information he thought might
be helpful to the lawsuit. 289 He further testified that he first discussed
possible compensation with McAlindin when he and McAlindin met for
him to sign his affidavit because, until then, it had been uncertain

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 290 n.4.
Civ. No. 06-6147, 2009 WL 3246837 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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whether Rocheux would use his testimony.2 9 ° When questioned on the
subjects on which he was designated as an expert, Gutierrez gave
equivocal and uninformed answers that did not help Rocheux's case. 291
The defendants moved to exclude Gutierrez as an improperly paid
fact witness and contended that Rocheux designated him as an expert
witness to deliberately circumvent the prohibition against paying fact
witnesses for testifying.292 They further sought to invalidate Gutierrez's
$1500 deposition fee and requested "appropriate sanctions for the
unethical behavior of [the] [p]laintiff's counsel. 29 3
After referring to New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b),
the Rocheux court asserted that lawyers may: (1) reimburse fact
witnesses for reasonable expenses incurred in attending trial; and
(2) reasonably pay witnesses for their time lost in appearing to testify.294
The court further stated that Congress codified this common law
principle in the federal anti-gratuity statute.295 Here, it was crystal clear
that Gutierrez was a fact witness and that McAlindin had improperly
paid Gutierrez for his testimony.296 When asked to identify the expert
opinions in Gutierrez's affidavit, McAlindin pointed to "factual evidence
based on lay observations" that lacked the reliable methodology required
by Federal Rule of Evidence 702297 for the admission of expert
testimony.29 8 McAlindin could not otherwise explain why Gutierrez
should be treated as an expert witness.299 Furthermore, the fee paid to
Gutierrez "most certainly did not compensate [him] for his costs of
attending trial or time lost during trial. 3 °° In summary, McAlindin's
payment to Gutierrez violated the longstanding ban on paying fact
witnesses for their testimony.30 '
The court reasoned that McAlindin's decision to pay Gutierrez for
factual testimony had "cast a cloud over the legitimacy of that
testimony," and that it was up to the court "to prevent this suspect
evidence from contaminating future proceedings. 30 2 The court
accordingly excluded Gutierrez's testimony, excused the defendants
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

294.

Id.at *3.

295. Id.
296. Id.
297.

FED. R. EviD. 702.

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Rocheux, 2009 WL 3246837, at *3.
Id.at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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from paying Gutierrez's expert fee for his deposition, and awarded the
defendants their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result
of McAlindin's misconduct.3 °3 Somewhat ominously, the court noted
that the defendants had not moved to disqualify McAlindin and that such
a severe sanction did not currently appear to be necessary, but cautioned
that it would "reserve judgment on the need for additional sanctions or
disciplinary action pending further application. 3 °4
McAlindin's reported conduct in Rocheux was seriously misguided.
Gutierrez clearly was a fact witness-a largely useless one as it turned
out, but a fact witness nonetheless-and his compensation was
objectively unreasonable.30 5 McAlindin plainly paid Gutierrez for his
testimony rather than for his time.30 6 In the end, though, what
distinguishes Rocheux is the fact that Gutierrez was a former employee
of a defendant rather than a former employee of Rocheux. 30 7 Paying a
fact witness who is a former employee of an adversary, rather than a
former employee of the party that the person is assisting, invites
accusations of misconduct. 30 8 That is not to say the practice is always
improper, but, from a lawyer's perspective, it will be a rare case in
which the potential reward outweighs the associated risk.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWYERS

Lawyers handling litigation, arbitration, or administrative
proceedings will, at some point, either want to compensate fact
witnesses for assisting them in matters or will be asked by fact witnesses
about the possibility of compensation for their time or services. How
should careful lawyers approach these situations?
First, lawyers should attempt to ascertain the law of the jurisdiction
on compensating fact witnesses. 30 9 This may require analysis of
applicable rules of professional conduct, case law, and ethics opinions
by state or local bar associations, as well as state statutes pertaining to

303. Id.
304. Id.at *5.
305. Id. at *3-4.
306. Id.at *3.
307. Id.at *4.
308. See, e.g., Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 09-11783, 2011 WL
1812505, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2011) (discussing a magistrate's findings regarding a party's
payment of a fact witness who was formerly employed by an opponent).
309. Villa, supra note 12, at 113.
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bribery and witness tampering and cases interpreting those statutes. State
and federal courts may have local rules bearing on the issue, and, in
federal cases, there is the federal anti-gratuity statute to keep in mind. °
Depending on where a fact witness resides, a case is pending, or a
lawyer practices, there may be choice of law considerations to
sort through.3 1'
Second, lawyers should never pay fact witnesses for their
testimony, regardless of whether the payment is for the fact of a
witness's testimony, or its content or substance. 3 2 A fact witness's
compensation may never be contingent upon the fact, content, or
substance of the witness's testimony, or the outcome of the litigation.3 13
A requirement
that a witness's testimony be truthful will not cure any of
314
ills.
these
Third, but consistent with the prior point, lawyers should
compensate fact witnesses only for their time lost to testifying, preparing
to testify, or otherwise legitimately assisting in the preparation of a case,
plus reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred in connection with
those activities.31 5 Any compensation should be objectively
reasonable.31 6 The closer a fact witness's compensation comes to
approximating her direct loss of income, the more likely a court will find

310. See id.
311. See id. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2013) (establishing
disciplinary authority choice of law rules).
312. See Villa, supra note 12, at 112 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4
cmt. 3).
313. See, e.g., Ward v. Nierlich, No. 99-14227-CIV, 2006 WL 5412626, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
20, 2006) (recommending sanctions in a case in which the plaintiffs and their lawyers "corrupted
the judicial process and committed a fraud on this [c]ourt by paying defense witnesses for their
testimony," and explaining that the witnesses "were promised a substantial stake in this litigation
based on a favorable judgment or settlement for [p]laintiffs"); In re Telcar Grp., Inc., 363 B.R. 345,
355 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007). In refusing to approve a settlement between a bankruptcy trustee and a
former principal of the debtor who was a fact witness in litigation related to the bankruptcy, the
court stated:
[T]he sums that may become due to [the witness] under the settlement, or the credits to
which he may become entitled, have no relation to the amount of time expended by [the
witness] or the reasonable cost in attending or testifying at any proceedings, but are
entirely contingent upon the outcome of the contemplated litigation.
In re Telcar Grp., Inc., 363 B.R. at 355.
314. See, e.g., Rocheux Int'l of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merch. Fin. Grp., Inc., Civ. No. 06-6147,
2009 WL 3246837, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009); Ward, 2006 WL 5412626, at *4; In re Telcar Grp.,
Inc., 363 BR. at 354; In re Kien, 372 N.E.2d 376, 379 (I11.1977).
315. ABA Formal Op. 96-402, supra note 61.
316. Id.
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it to be reasonable.3 17 In the absence of direct loss, a lawyer should
calculate the "reasonable value of the witness's time based on all of the
relevant circumstances., 31 8 At bottom, there must be an explainable and
logical connection between the amount of time or effort a fact witness
devotes to a matter and the amount of the witness's compensation. 319
Lawyers should not offer benefits to fact witnesses in addition to
reasonable payment for time lost or reimbursement of reasonable
expenses that courts or disciplinary authorities may view as influencing,
even unintentionally, the witness's testimony. 320 Such benefits might
include promises of future employment or business opportunities with
the lawyer's client, promises of favorable treatment in transactions or
business dealings with the lawyer's client, arrangements or extensions of
loans or credit, forgiveness of debts owed to the lawyer's client, or
indemnity agreements. Returning for a moment to the Solvent case,
ICC's and Dover's agreements to indemnify Beu are prime examples
of arrangements with witnesses that courts may well regard as
improper inducements.3 2'
Fourth, lawyers should avoid paying fact witnesses who were
formerly employed by another party in the litigation-especially an
opposing party.322 They should be similarly cautious when considering
whether to compensate fact witnesses who, while not formerly employed
by an adversary, are expected to be key witnesses for that party.323 To be
sure, cases in which lawyers have been sanctioned or reprimanded for
compensating former employees of opposing parties or key witnesses for
adversaries have involved obviously impermissible payments for

317. See id.
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., Villa, supra note 12, at 115 n.32 (providing examples of objective standards in
assessing reasonableness). In the case of professionals who testify as fact witnesses, for example, it
generally is reasonable to compensate them for their lost time at their professional rates. See Smith
v. Pfizer Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 845, 852-53 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (discussing payment of a medical
doctor who was a fact witness at her professional rate of $500 per hour).
320. See Villa, supra note 12, at 112.
321. New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 166 F.R.D. 284, 289-90 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
322. See, e.g., Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 09-11783, 2011 WL
1812505, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2011) (discussing a magistrate's findings regarding a party's
payment of a fact witness who was formerly employed by an opponent); Rocheux Int'l of N.J., Inc.
v. U.S. Merch. Fin. Grp., Inc., Civ. No. 06-6147, 2009 WL 3246837, at *1, *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009)
(imposing sanctions where the plaintiff's lawyer compensated a disgruntled former employee of a
defendant); Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 654-58 (M.D. Fla.
1992) (disqualifying lawyer who employed adversary's former employee, who was a fact witness,
as a "trial consultant").
323. See Ward v. Nierlich, No. 99-14227-CIV, 2006 WL 5412626, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20,
2006) (noting that conduct by plaintiffs and their counsel was especially "egregious" because they
"did not simply pay their own witnesses, but paid critical witnesses for the defense").
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testimony rather than reasonable compensation for time lost, but it
remains true that certain categories of fact witnesses are more likely to
invite charges of unethical payment or witness tampering, and these are
two of them.3 24 None of this is to say that fact witnesses falling into
these categories never can be properly compensated by a party other
than a former employer or expected beneficiary of their testimony, but it
is to say that the risks of compensating these witnesses frequently
outweigh any possible rewards, and that lawyers should therefore
exercise extreme caution in this area.
Fifth, lawyers should not purport to prohibit fact witnesses from
speaking with other parties or their lawyers as part of any compensation
arrangement.3 25 Rules of professional conduct generally prevent lawyers
from attempting to so restrict witnesses.326 For example, Model Rule
3.4(f) establishes that a lawyer cannot "request a person other than a
client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another
party" except in very limited circumstances.3 27
Sixth, lawyers should put compensation agreements with fact
witnesses in writing. 328 An agreement should clearly state that the
witness is being compensated for the reasonable value of her time and
being reimbursed for her reasonable expenses rather than being paid for
the fact, content, or substance of her testimony. 329 Accuracy and clarity
are important here for two reasons. First, witnesses must understand
what is expected of them. Second, compensation agreements with fact
witnesses will almost certainly have to be produced in discovery, and it
is critical that they be drafted in ways that will discourage challenges by
3 30
opposing parties and withstand scrutiny by reviewing courts.
Specifying in writing that witnesses are being compensated solely for the
reasonable value of their time and are being reimbursed for the
reasonable value of their expenses is essential to discouraging and
surviving such challenges and scrutiny.
Finally, lawyers should inform the other parties in a case of the
existence and terms of any agreements to compensate fact witnesses.3 31
This should be done sufficiently early in a case to permit other parties to

324. See id. at *4.
325. Villa, supra note 12, at 114.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a), (f) (2013).
Id. R. 3.4(f).
McRae & Nortman, supra note 117, at 34; Villa, supranote 12, at 114.
Villa, supra note 12, at 114.
See McRae & Nortman, supra note 117, at 34.
Villa, supra note 12, at 114.
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conduct discovery on the issue if they wish.3 32 Certainly, lawyers should
accurately and timely respond to written discovery regarding fact
witnesses' compensation or employment. 333 If witnesses are directly
asked about their compensation in depositions and answer inaccurately,
the lawyers producing them for their depositions must correct their
testimony.334 If a witness is not asked about her compensation in a
deposition and it has not previously been revealed in some other context
or form, the lawyer producing the witness for the deposition may want to
consider revealing the compensation arrangement before the deposition
is adjourned, so that any party that wants to explore the subject is then
able to do so.
Setting aside for a moment the clearly improper practice of paying
fact witnesses solely for their testimony, paying a fact witness only for
the reasonable value of her time and expenses incurred in testifying at a
deposition, trial, or other proceeding is rarely controversial.3

35

Most

battles arise out of consulting arrangements in which witnesses devote
significant time to case preparation, or to otherwise assisting in some
fashion, the lawyers for the party paying them. 336 Even so, lawyers may

wish to disclose all fact witness compensation agreements, no matter
how obviously reasonable or innocuous, simply to avoid accusations of
misconduct by aggressive adversaries.
V.

CONCLUSION

The ASPCA paid dearly for employing Tom Rider to help it
champion the ethical treatment of circus elephants.33 7 Most cases in
which lawyers or parties pay fact witnesses for their services are much
tamer. But the fact remains that compensating fact witnesses is a
potentially perilous exercise. The general rule that lawyers and litigants
may compensate fact witnesses for time spent testifying or preparing to
testify, and may reimburse witnesses' associated expenses, so long as the
amounts paid to or on behalf of a witness are reasonable, is not

332.
333.
334.
335.

See McRae & Nortman, supra note 117, at 34.
Hardaway, supra note 17, at 53.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), 3.4(b) (2013).
Villa, supra note 12, at 112.

336.
337.

See McRae & Nortman, supra note 117, at 32.
Gresko, supra note 1.
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uniformly applied or reliably followed.3 38 Unfortunately, this general
rule, like others, has exceptions, and even in jurisdictions that regularly
adhere to it, the reasonableness of fact witnesses' compensation is a
recurring point of controversy. The best that can be said is that when it
comes to compensating fact witnesses, the price is only sometimes right.

338. See McRae & Nortman, supra note 117, at 32 (noting that while most jurisdictions follow
the ABA interpretations, allowing payment for fact witnesses, other states interpret their laws to
disfavor these payments).
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